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In September, Human Rights Watch released a scathing report on the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a 
paramilitary institution under control of the Minister of Interior and being trained by US Special 
Operations Forces in Afghanistan.[1]  The report highlighted accusations of violence, thievery, and 
corruption that plague the ALP and continue to raise questions of long-term viability as Afghanistan and 
the US prepare for the 2014 transition. As of September there were roughly 7,500 ALP spread throughout 
46 districts, with an anticipated expansion to 30,000. Accusations of lawlessness and indiscriminate 
violence can be problematic for a weak Afghan state attempting to quell an insurgency and link rural 
populations with a fledgling government. This essay argues that a number of historical lessons from more 
violent and harsh counterinsurgencies should be kept in mind as the ALP program expands. These lessons 
suggest that paramilitary groups require: 1) supervision from state sponsors; 2) broad and deep cutting 
institutional reach; and 3) support from path dependent models.
Historical and exogenous lessons abound of state-led initiatives to devolve security to the local level. 
Many point to counterinsurgency examples in Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, and more recently the Sons 
of Iraq.  However, this essay diverges from traditional examples to assess other conflicts such as 
Indonesia, East Timor, Sudan, and Kenya to see what lessons can be gleaned from comparatively less 
studied conflicts. It should be noted that not all lessons can or should be transferred from one region to 
another. The successes and failures of counterinsurgency are often based upon local and unique dynamics 
that may not be replicable. Furthermore, these cases certainly do not present the best comparisons in terms 
of similarity, however, it can equally be argued that there are few cases in counterinsurgency that are 
similar enough to draw qualitative comparison at the scholarly level. That does not imply this to be wasted 
effort; instead it serves as a useful opportunity to draw out important practical lessons for current 
operational and strategic imperatives. 
These cases provide useful context for practitioners to better understand and interpret the complex 
environment of intra-state war and the use of paramilitary actors. First, even in environments of “softened 
sovereignty,”[2] the vast majority of paramilitary groups are organized by, or with consent of the state in 
order to act as a force multiplier and an economy of force in support of military or law enforcement 
operations. While state-sponsored militias are supportive of the state, they also represent a form of 
contentious politics that use violence as a means to “protect the established order as opposed to 
overthrowing it.”[3] Second, David Kilcullen suggests that in an insurgency, when the state is facing an 
existential threat, authority “flows away from civilian leaders at the level of the central or national state, 
toward local armed leaders, and toward the village or tribal level.”[4]  Such leaders are empowered with 
legitimacy from the state; they are “embedded” within the local social system, and are given increasing 
authority as the conflict persists.[5] These cases provide examples of weak states, facing intra-state war, 
attempting to quell insurgency in areas that were alternatively governed. Its important to keep in mind a 
major difference between these cases and Afghanistan, that is, liberal peace theory did not play a part in 
the state-building efforts such as it has in Afghanistan.[6]
This essay proceeds by introducing each respective case and providing brief contextual background to 
understand the nature of paramilitary evolution.  It then offers a few lessons learned from each case. 
Finally, it summarizes lessons learned and briefly describes how they may be conceptualized in reference 
to the VSO / ALP program in Afghanistan.
East Timor & Indonesia
East Timor was the subject of a brutal and violent insurgency against Indonesian occupation from 1975 till 
independence in 1999. Over 200,000 were killed in an insurgency marked by extensive use of paramilitary 
forces supported by the Indonesian government. In November 1975, East Timor declared itself 
independent from Portugal.  Nine days later, Indonesian forces invaded and occupied East Timor, 
incorporating the territory as its 27th province by 1976. 
The first lesson of paramilitary development in East Timor was the function of state sponsorship. The 
Indonesia state played a significant role in mobilization, recruitment, and resource provisions for local 
defense forces. There were three primary methods of state-sponsored resource mobilization. First, the use 
of paramilitary forces was part of a covert deception campaign called Operasis Komodo, designed to 
prepare East Timor for takeover by implanting Indonesian armed forces within pro-Indonesian political 
parties Apodeti and UDT.[7] The campaign was successful in making it appear that the thousands of 
irregular forces were volunteers, when in fact a majority of the militias were composed of Indonesian 
regular troops. Hence, the start of paramilitary groups in East Timor was a fallacy. As auxiliary forces 
were constructed in post-1976, military control was prevalent all throughout the country to the extent that 
while civilian authorities were officially elected, they held little real power. This was problematic in 
building sustainable local capacity of paramilitary groups; for example, the first significant militias 
recruited were often forced by gunpoint to join. For the first 15 years of Indonesian rule, East Timor was 
sealed to outside eyes giving the Indonesian military the liberty to conduct a “total people’s defense” 
without international condemnation.[8]
Second, the state institutionalized paramilitary behavior. Robinson argues that the path dependency of 
paramilitarism in Indonesian and Timorese societies served as an institutional foundation for its continued 
use. Militias were shaped by the Indonesian experience in other counterinsurgency missions, such as in 
Aceh against the Darul Islam rebels in the 1950s, or the anti-communist purges in 1965. The “fence of 
legs” tactic, perfected in these conflicts was also instituted in villages throughout East Timor.[9] This 
tactic was a force multiplier and an economy of force measure that utilized the local population as 
counterinsurgents. Militias and their state patrons borrowed heavily from historical and traditional models 
of local paramilitary organizations that were based on traditional pre-colonial models or influenced by 
foreign colonial powers.[10] Paramilitary groups often performed as if they were following a historical 
script—costumes and weaponry, targeted beatings and killings, mutilation of victims, and staging attacks 
in a way that appeared theatrical—as Robinson suggests, “they created the impression of men in a state of 
frenzy, shouting and slashing the air with their weapons…as one imagines a man ‘running amok’.”[11]
While vicious, this behavior served to institutionalize the performance and motivate others to re-enact 
heroic figures before them. 
Third, the state provided a great deal of material and logistical resources for the militias to be a coherent 
organization. Training was hosted by Indonesian Special Forces (Koppassus), uniforms were issued to 
some paramilitary groups, weapons and funds were provided to most, and intelligence sharing between 
military and militias was common.  For example in 1995, under Major-General Prabowo’s command, 
Garda Paksi (Upholders of Integration Guard)—a paramilitary intelligence collection brigade was 
comprised of unemployed Timorese youth and Apodeti members.[12]  After separate military training 
courses with TNI and Koppassus, the Garda Paksi were dispatched to collect intelligence on the East 
Timorese movement, in particular, the Clandestine Front.
Cribb writes that historically the Indonesian military has been “reluctant” to give up its monopoly of 
violence to the wide-scale establishment of militias “that could develop into death squads” that have 
threatened the state in the past.[13] But this reluctance has frequently been curbed by perceived existential 
threats, such as communism and anarchy. After the September 1999 referendum that brought a vote of 
independence in East Timor, Indonesian troops and their militia counterparts again swept through the 
country killing an estimated one to two thousand civilians and displacing over 500,000.[14]
There are many examples of states using proxy forces to subdue conflict-prone areas, upset nonaligned 
regions, or empower territorial elites loyal to the state. As Robinson explains in describing the Indonesian 
influence on militias in East Timor, paramilitary forces were shaped by the political and institutional 
structures of a variety of states and an evolving legal and normative system.  Militias borrowed heavily 
from historical and traditional models of local paramilitary organizations that were based heavily on 
traditional pre-colonial models or influenced by foreign colonial powers like Japan.[15]
Japan’s use of Paramilitaries in Indonesia
Japan provides another lesson in mobilization through widespread institution building. During the Second 
World War, as a force multiplier at the local level, the Japanese set up Keibodan (Auxillary Police), 
Seinendan (Youth Organization) and Barisan Pelopor or Suishintai (Pioneer Brigade).  These groups were 
quasi-militarized, obtaining various forms of military training in hand-to-hand combat and bamboo spears.
[16] Many of those recruited into these organizations were mere extensions of the gang underworld, which 
the Japanese attempted to quell, but were more than willing to accept into the new militarized hierarchy. 
Their skills in guerilla warfare and connections with large numbers of violent individuals were used 
against the Allied invasion of Java. Cribb also notes, this was a continuation of pre-colonial policies that 
moved gangsters and warlords into political and security positions such as chief of police.[17]
The Japanese realized the utility for control mechanisms.  Institutions were put in place to keep the rising 
Jakarta underworld in check.  Called the Defenders of the Fatherland or PETA (Pembela Tanah Air), this 
civil defense force was an auxiliary military outfit commanded by Indonesians at the battalion level. They 
recruited locally and intended to place local notables in battalion level command position in order to 
attract aspirants to join. The PETAs had strong solidarity, consisting of small units, with specific 
assignments; they were well armed and well trained, often training the Youth Organization and Auxiliary 
Police.[18] A second nonmilitary youth corps was established in 1944 called Barisan Pelopor that was run 
under exclusive Indonesian leadership.  Benda reports that this group became a critical instrument in the 
organization of guerilla warfare throughout Java, rivaling the Hizbu’llah movement.[19]
In addition, Japan exploited Islam to mobilize citizens to defend their communes and provide security in 
the new Japanese colony. Unlike their Dutch predecessors that imposed a European value system, Japan 
relied upon traditional belief systems as an organizing principle at the local level. The Japanese built a 
structured hierarchy during their occupation that ensured orders from the top filtered down to individual 
families.  Within this order, there were village heads that were incentivized with paid four-year terms to 
support Japanese objectives.[20] Within two weeks of arriving in Java, the Japanese introduced its Office 
of Religious Affairs, a system they had organized in Japan years prior and had prepared to implement 
upon arrival.[21]  Even before colonizing Japan, as part of their “Asia for the Asians” program, Japan 
started building contacts with Indonesian nationalists and Muslim parties.[22]  But one needs to go back 
to the mid-1920’s in Japan, where institutes were established committed to the study of Islam in 
preparation for building a sophisticated propaganda campaign.[23] The relationships built between Japan 
and Muslim adherents would assist the Japanese with pockets of resistors throughout Indonesia. Japan 
relied upon the Office of Religious Affairs to provide the contacts for each and every notable religious 
scholar in Java.  These scholars would pave the way for recruiting Indonesians into labor battalions (
romusha) and civil defense forces.[24]  One of the largest organizations, the Indonesian Volunteer Corps (
Peta), recruited many of its first officers from Muslim schools.[25] In preparation for an impending Allied 
invasion, Japan organized a large number of native forces as a buffer.
The period of Japan’s rule was short-lived, lasting around 40 months between 1942–45.  However, it had a 
significant impact on mobilizing the civilian population against Dutch colonial rule and then in support of 
consolidating Japanese defense against a renewed Allied invasion. While the reliance upon Islamic elites 
in Indonesia was successful in mobilizing the population, it had a detrimental impact upon traditional 
power structures. Benda notes a “readjustment” occurred which upset the internal momentum of society 
that traditionally relied upon the aristocratic elite.[26]
After the collapse of Japanese rule, Indonesians ransacked armories for weapons leaving militias to their 
own devices in the countryside. This would prove problematic for the development of the future 
Indonesian state. The foundation of modern-criminal militias in Indonesia began in the post-WWII 
environment where a number of powerful, armed individuals were suddenly the new powerbrokers in 
town. Cribb writes that a “swelling wave of lawlessness swept the countryside” after WWII.[27] Groups 
like the jago, lasykar, and preman, all bandits and strongmen that have rested between the margins of the 
criminal world and enforcers of law and order were called upon to enact crude forms of justice in order to 
burgeon stability and state control.[28] Under this environment, local strongmen only had to devote their 
allegiance to the Republic in order to move into the emerging governance structure.[29] Many of these 
new powerbrokers would keep their connections with the gang underworld and build a hybrid alliance 
between those with state power and those with gangland influence. If gangsters weren’t robbing for their 
own personal gain, they were doing it for somebody else.[30]
Kenya
The Mau Mau rebellion presented the British with an opportunity to wage a decisive victory in 
counterinsurgency warfare that would be emulated by future practitioners.  Official figures placed the 
number of “Mau Mau”[31] killed at 12,000; however some argue this number ranged as high as 20,000.
[32]  More than 150,000 members of the Kikuyu ethnic group were placed in detention camps; the vast 
majority held without trial.[33]  Between 1952—1958, the colonial court executed 1,090 suspected Mau 
Mau for violations ranging from murder to administering oaths of support to Kikuyu.[34]  In contrast, less 
than one hundred Europeans and around 1,800 loyalists were killed during the conflict.[35] This disparity 
of violence shows the British colonial authority had a decisive victory over the resistance, but like the 
other cases presented, it raises the question at what cost? 
The British implemented lessons learned against Malayan guerillas and Boers in South Africa to develop 
their strategies in Kenya.[36] While the resistance movement started through various political processes as 
early as the 1940s, the start of counterinsurgency operations was on 20 October 1952, when British 
declared a State of Emergency and deployed the First Lancashire Fusiliers from the Canal Zone, the Kings 
African Rifles (KAR) which consisted of African troops from Uganda (4th KAR), Tanganyika (6th KAR), 
and local KAR battalions. In the beginning of the campaign, British troops were stationed in the White 
Highlands, while KAR battalions were engaging Mau Mau in the Central Province.[37] Furedi argues that 
the term “emergency” allowed the British to adopt a wide range of coercive tactics and powers and helped 
“create the impression that the issue at stake was that of law and order rather than a political challenge to 
colonialism…at a stroke anti-colonial activists could be transformed into criminals or terrorists.”[38]
One of the first counterinsurgency endeavors taken by British authorities was to reform Mau Mau 
combatants. Commander-in-chief of the colonial armed forces, General George Erskine—a figure 
personally selected by Winston Churchill—harnessed emergency committees at the provincial and district 
levels to better intelligence gathering capabilities through rudimentary, but effective interrogations at the 
village level.  Suspected insurgents were frequently paraded in front of their communities where Home 
Guards would point out Mau Mau activists and make public examples of them. This collective punishment 
was applied regularly to communities that refused to cooperate with government officials or who were in 
some way protecting Mau Mau insurgents.  Forms of punishment included fines on whole villages, taxes, 
and appropriation of property such as cattle or land.[39] One of the problems with this policy is that it was 
generally applied wholesale and at will by Home Guards who saw collective punishment as a way to 
obtain war booty. 
The premise that Mau Mau would have to be “decontaminated” in order to be a functional member of 
Kenyan society in which Britain remained the colonial authority prevailed in British reform initiatives.[40]
Some argued that education reforms should require the overhaul of the entire system.[41]  Reforms would 
begin by closing down many Kikuyu run schools that were thought to be safehouses for Mau Mau. This 
backfired as no other system was put in their place—teachers lost jobs and students were displaced from a 
structured education. Anderson marks this as a turning point in the revolution, driving many to take up the 
call of resistance.[42] Additionally, Christian missionaries were used to exploit religious views of the Mau 
Mau—recordings of converts were played at detention camps to convince Mau Mau to confess and turn 
towards Christianity.[43] A final effort was the initiation of land reform to help address some of the 
grievances Kikuyu held. The squatter system imposed by British authorities became more complex over 
time as the share of land a squatter held diminished. One way the British sought to diffuse the problem 
was by confiscating Mau Mau territory, consolidating it, and placing re-educated Kikuyu on the land. 
However, the program was problematic; diverse groups of individuals wanted their own land, not a large 
sharecropping system imposed by outside authorities.[44]
The Home Guards were an effective element that fractured and divided the insurgency. They served as a 
civil defense force or auxiliary security element providing a force multiplier that could control the local 
population and prevent insurgent infiltration into villages. Ideally, this is how Home Guards were 
constructed; however, in reality there were problems with the organization from the start. First, there was 
no real mandate defining the Home Guards and their role. Second, early on Mau Mau sympathizers 
heavily infiltrated the organization, and it was difficult to determine one’s loyalty from the outset.[45]
While figures showed the Home Guards killed up to 42 percent of suspected Mau Mau insurgents, many 
of the killings were mass executions often involving innocent civilians, further provoking Mau Mau 
reprisals.[46] The March 1953 Mau Mau attack in Lari on a village, housing family members of Home 
Guard, left over 120 killed, mostly women and children.[47] This offensive operation by Mau Mau would 
force a “reappraisal of the operational command structure” of British counterinsurgency.[48]  The 
following day, Home Guards pursued vengeance by killing over 200 suspected Mau Mau.
As much as the Home Guards presented a liability in terms of control management, overall it was a key 
asset to the British. As an economy of force and a force multiplier, the Home Guards could control the 
local population in a manner the British alone could not. David Galula argues that pure military action will 
not ensure victory in counterinsurgency operations: “If it is possible to destroy the insurgent political 
organization by intensive police action, it is impossible to prevent the return of the guerilla units and the 
rebuilding of the political cells unless the population cooperates.”[49]  By having a large number of 
Kikuyu as Home Guards, many of whom may have previously been moderates within the Mau Mau, the 
British were able to put decisive pressure on the resistance.
A third factor that led to British success in Kenya was the villagization policy.  Starting as a punitive 
measure to block off areas considered influenced by Mau Mau, it became a strategy to separate Kikuyu 
from the rest of the population. While many likely welcomed the protection, over a million were 
forcefully relocated to one of several villages that instituted forced labor campaigns such as building 
moats around the outskirts of the village and participating in agriculture programs. The British prevented 
Kikuyu movement outside Kikuyu land, prevented movement outside one’s district, in general, restricted 
the use of motor transit or train by Kikuyu, and prevented those working on one of these villages from 
leaving the vicinity without a pre-authorized permit.[50] The villages were secured by Home Guards that 
had posts at the entrance and along watchtowers throughout the village. The villages were typically 
surrounded by barbed wire fencing and deep moats that prevented easy penetration. On the inside of the 
compound, a trench like system was built along the inside of the barbed wire fencing so that villagers 
could take a defensive stand against Mau Mau attacks. These fortified structures were essential at night 
when many Mau Mau attacks would occur. While this policy was punitive in one sense, it was also meant 
to create a dependency on the government and the Home Guards protecting its authority. It served as a 
form of re-education process where the residents of the village were meant to feel comfortable as opposed 
to imprisoned. Hoffman and Taw argue that this policy was effective at improving native agriculture and 
social services and was part of the overall “hearts and minds” campaign. Elkins argues that British 
archives tell a narrative that the camps were not punitive in nature but a way of civilizing the Kikuyu 
population.[51] Overall, the villagization program was successful but radical in today’s ideas of 
counterinsurgency best practices.
A fourth factor in helping the British win in Kenya was their use of pseudo-gangs used for search and 
destroy missions.  Officially, pseudo-gangs were “teams of former insurgents who served as double 
agents, returning to the jungle to gather intelligence from insurgent loyalists in their former areas of 
operation.”[52] Around 300—400 surrendered insurgents were part of the pseudo-gang operation, 
providing excellent intelligence back to British security forces.[53] However, gangs also served as 
assassins or death squads with the power to take down suspected Mau Mau with little oversight. Early on, 
white soldiers would often accompany the pseudo-gangs when appropriate, disguised in “black face;” later 
the gangs would maneuver through enemy territory without escort.[54] These members were given 
salaries, protection of family members via relocation, and other incentives by British authorities—namely 
the opportunity to reclaim an identity outside the Mau Mau movement. Pseudo-gangs consisted of what 
McConnel and counterinsurgent experts refer to as “reformed” Mau Mau because they were willing to 
“hunt down and kill or capture their former Mau Mau brethren.”[55]
Could the British have defeated the Mau Mau without overwhelming force?  It’s not clear.  Political 
openings, economic reforms, and land issues were all too costly for the British at the time to address in 
great detail. In terms of what they sought to achieve—suppression of resistance in order to maintain 
colonial authority—strong force paved the way. The British turned Kenya over to moderate Mau Mau in 
1963 with the election of Jomo Kenyatta. The campaign in Kenya is looked upon as an overwhelming 
success in counterinsurgency practice, however modern day practitioners should be clear of the 
overwhelming force that was used in Kenya in order to attain success.
Sudan
Sudan presents a third unconventional case in the use of local defense forces, primarily since their use 
falls outside the Western norms of implementing a liberal peace.[56]  However, like many nations 
engaged in state-building, the Sudanese government has relied upon the support of national militia 
organizations, such as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and preexisting, self-mobilized pastoral militias, 
such as the Janjaweed, to assist in extending the counterinsurgency reach of the central government.[57]  
This section finds there are three main lessons to be learned from Sudan’s engagement with paramilitary 
organizations: the weakness of controlling processes, the use of a national narrative, and the utility of 
economic incentives.
In 1986, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi was disappointed in the failure of the Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF) and PDF to quell the insurgency in southern Sudan. As a result, he armed his Baqqara tribe in the 
south and encouraged them to “pillage, rape, enslave, and kill” the Dinka that made up the SPLA, or the 
Sudan Peoples Liberation Army.[58] Another Baqqara group, the Rizayqat began conducting raids in 
Darfur against Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa, tribes that they previously quarreled with over water and land 
issues.[59] These groups remained armed even after the 1989 coup, under the assumption that they would 
eventually be integrated into the PDF. However, by keeping the Janjaweed outside the PDF, it gave the 
government additional leverage as a tertiary force behind the SAF and PDF. This would prove 
instrumental as the SAF faced a resilient rebel resistance in Darfur.
Instrumental in both the southern and western insurgencies was the perceived absence of control 
mechanisms that one would typically expect of a state seeking to control the monopoly of violence. Some 
argue this may be a primary motivation for utilizing militias in the first place, particularly as international 
regimes such as the United Nations and human rights organizations pressured Khartoum. A level of 
deniability was helpful when gross human rights atrocities occurred allowing the government to blame 
violence on inter-tribal, ethnic, or aged-old hatreds. In addition, the relationship between China and Sudan 
played a significant role in allowing Sudan to ignore the chaos paramilitary forces orchestrated, and 
facilitated the intensity of the counter-insurgency fight in Darfur. As the largest recipient of Sudanese oil, 
China supplied Sudan with small arms, mortars and other military equipment for use in Darfur.[60]
Among the economic motivations for supporting paramilitary groups was the relative affordability of 
willing fighters. The Janjaweed were not spontaneously reacting to rebel violence, rather they were 
“organized, politicized and militarized groups.”[61] They were composed of a number of different social 
identities including thieves and highwaymen, demobilized SAF, common criminals, extremist members of 
the Tajammu al-Arabi, and young unemployed Arab men.[62] Some of the Janjaweed were paid by Sudan 
a salary of U.S. equivalent $79 per month, or $117 if he had a horse or camel; officers received as much as 
$233.[63] Besides the salary, most Janjaweed earned a living based on the spoils of genocide. Sudanese 
government documents directed Janjaweed to commit: “killings, burning of villages, farms and terrorize 
and rob properties from African tribes and force them to migrate outside Darfur.”[64] Additionally, 
Janjaweed were housed and trained on military bases and air assets were provided prior to and during 
attacks.[65] Prunier adds that the Janjaweed would clearly tell their victims of the economic motivations 
for their attacks and that their actions were fully endorsed by the state.[66]
While the Janjaweed were created to be a less regulated force, the Popular Defense Forces were intended 
“to train citizens on military and civil capabilities, to raise security awareness and military discipline (…) 
[and serve] as a support force to the other regular [forces].”[67] In 1991, around 150,000 were conscripted 
into the organization, of which service in the PDF was required for both men and women. While civilian 
volunteers at the state, local and community levels organized recruitment events, service in the PDF was 
considered unpopular with many wealthy families purchasing their children’s obligation.[68] As tribal 
militias were augmented into the PDF system, tribal leaders were commissioned as PDF coordinators for 
their respective area.[69] As an organizing mechanism, the PDF became a convenient method for the state 
to bring disparate militias under state direction and control, thus formalizing the informal. While PDF was 
an affordable mechanism to organize preexisting militias, discipline and organization problems continued. 
For example, militias that operated alongside the military would often deliberately mislead their military 
counterparts in order to loot high value areas.[70]  
The final lesson is how Sudan mobilized paramilitary groups. Hassan al-Turabi and the National Islamic 
Front (NIF) sought to unify the nation under an Arab and Islamic identity. The NIF marketed the PDF as 
an “authentic Islamic model of military organization – a citizen’s army of volunteer mujahid prepared for 
frontline battle.”[71]  Urban youth movements such as the Youth of the Nation were inspired to align with 
the PDF. During the two-month training-cycle, PDF received religious indoctrination that served to unify 
disparate identities that previously fell under tribal or clan affiliations. Propaganda was widespread on 
radio, newspaper, and word-of-mouth celebrating the martyr identity of fallen PDF. While the state tried 
to characterize the southern conflict as a holy war, it’s questionable whether this narrative was effective. 
Large-scale desertion of the PDF resulted after the Sudanese security forces conducted an isolated mass 
slaughter of teenage PDF conscripts in April 1998, on the Islamic holiday Eid al Adha. [72]
While the PDF was a national movement that was timely in mobilizing and consolidating disparate 
militias in Southern Sudan it ultimately failed to crush the insurgency in the south due to inadequate 
training, poor equipment, and failure to acclimatize to the swamps and rainforests of Southern Sudan. 
Rebellion in Darfur required a different counterinsurgency force, one less centralized and more local then 
the PDF. Decentralized, ill-disciplined vigilantes known as Janjaweed were better suited at defeating the 
Darfur rebellion in the west, though at extreme human and social costs. Prunier suggests Khartoum was 
following the theories of British counterinsurgency to the point—turning refuge camps into “strategic 
hamlets” where the population could be “secured,” even as Janjaweed waited like wolves outside the 
camps for wandering refugees.[73]
Historical Lessons
There are a few lessons drawn from the cases above that are worthy of reflection for the implementation 
of paramilitary forces in Afghanistan. It should be reiterated that international efforts in Afghanistan are 
theoretically following a liberal peace process in which reform occurs at state, institution, and individual 
levels to incorporate Western norms, concepts, and policies. In theory this is the case, in practice change 
may occur (or not) very differently. For example, the British in Kenya were imposing a worldview not in 
the interest of Kenya, but in the hopes of subduing a nation’s rebellion from colonialism. International 
efforts in Afghanistan are also based upon theoretical principals that do not always manifest perfectly in 
practice—hence many “warlords” are “reformed” members of the government. In theory, the Village 
Stability Operations (VSO) is a program intended to infuse capacity at the village level through a variety 
of security, development, and governance projects that build, bridge, and maintain effective institutions 
across village, district, and provincial levels. VSO mobilizes community members to provide their own 
security arrangements that are coordinated with district and provincial officials.  In some ways the 
program was shaped by the implementation of similar initiatives in Iraq, notably the Awakening Councils. 
Known as Afghan Local Police (ALP), these village defense forces are paramilitary organizations that 
defend their community, deny insurgent freedom of mobility, and provide intelligence to U.S. and Afghan 
security forces. While VSO has a methodology that closely subscribes to liberal peace theory mandates, in 
practice it may often fall far short.
One of the first lessons is the role of the state as a supervisor and supporter of local capacity-building 
initiatives. Many paramilitary groups are relatively autonomous from the state, such as arbakai in areas of 
southeast Afghanistan that tend to serve an important community-building influence in areas outside the 
reach of the state. However, other groups may be more nefarious and predatory, seeking individual gains 
versus collective or communal security. In all the cases examined, state-support was discernable, however 
these cases represented state’s that had less than ideal policy goals—the ends of counterinsurgency 
justified the means. In Afghanistan, the international community’s strategic goals, at least stated, are more 
idealistic; it seeks a liberal peace in which a legitimate, democratic Afghanistan government serves the 
interests of its people and the greater Western-dominated international community. Groups like the 
Afghan Local Police and the Afghan Public Protection Force are supervised by the international 
community and will likely require decades of further support to ensure Afghanistan meets and serves its 
obligation as a just and proper steward of public protection.  
A second lesson is that national paramilitary organizations should be incorporated into broad umbrella 
institutions that represent civic objectives and enable legitimate controlling processes over diverse 
violence wielders. Institutions such as the PDF in Sudan or the Pioneer Brigade in Indonesia had the 
capability to provide comprehensive bureaucratic, legal, and administrative functions that could 
eventually transfer forces into post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, 
however the institutions were largely hollow in these cases and served more to mobilize violence wielders. 
Institutions can serve as a training, education, and professional placement forum for rural and urban 
recruits. Institutions can also serve as a conduit to funnel talent and expand the capacity of the national 
military, civil service, and local businesses. Finally, placing violence wielders under institutional 
structures serves to build social capital as citizens begin to trust in the capability of the state to secure 
them versus individual paramilitary outfits (historically rural Afghans have sought the protection of tanzim
and other political / military alliances).  Paramilitary organizations are capable of serving as legitimate 
state builders or predatory actors—how (and whether) a state harnesses the talent will have much to bear 
in terms of long-term development.
The strength of the Afghan Local Police is that they are created within a framework that is founded upon 
security, development, and governance via the Village Stability Operations. VSO engages with civilian, 
government, and other local actors to bridge informal structures at the local level with more formal 
structures at the district and provincial level.  The long-term capacity of ALP will be dependent upon the 
viability and resourcing of VSO as the primary infrastructure of paramilitary organization. Therefore, 
continued international engagement and supervision will be critical post-2014.  In particular, as strongmen 
and “warlords” are incorporated into national security positions, such as General Abdul Razziq as Chief of 
Police (CoP) in Kandahar, or Matiullah Khan as CoP of Uruzgan—both strongmen with notorious, but 
rather exceptional leadership backgrounds—increased supervision and mentorship will be required to 
ensure these figures remain legitimate and accountable.
A third lesson is the historical role of paramilitarism in areas of alternative governance. A shared 
historical narrative of local defense served a useful function in state-less areas of East Timor and 
Indonesia. Paramilitarism was a path dependent behavior that replicated past role models and their 
characters. In some instances the state manufactured the narrative, in others, it simply exploited it to 
control mobilization, consolidate forces, and maneuver them as necessary towards the mission of state 
extension. Myth, narrative, and oral story telling have served useful functions for the Taliban in their 
mobilization of insurgents, however the Afghan state and international partners have generally been weak 
in this realm. Any successful paramilitary organization requires a broad and deeply embedded information 
and marketing campaign. In the short term and at the local level, these anti-Taliban narratives are 
prevalent among Afghan Local Police and their constituents within the village, however a long term and 
broad national narrative needs to be addressed to ensure ALP are linked with national objectives and the 
historical record of what it means to be an Afghan.
A final lesson is based upon planning for future operations.  The international community has invested ten 
years of its time in Afghanistan and still has limited knowledge at the local level.[74] Future conflicts will 
likely require less combat troops and more special operations forces to conduct foreign internal defense 
and other operations that utilize local skills and capacity. In other words, there will be greater reliance on 
paramilitary organizations and the value they provide as local state-builders. The Japanese had invested in 
an Office of Religious Affairs long before its invasion of Indonesia. This office contained the type of local 
knowledge and relationship building functions that the US should have had prior to engaging with both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Countries such as Sudan that do not have the same liberal peace requirements are not necessarily held 
under the same constraints. It is clear from the short review of cases that counterinsurgencies require 
difficult political and logistical requirements. Not every Chief of Police put into power will have lived a 
perfect life. On a daily basis, counterinsurgents are required to deal with malevolent actors whether they 
like it or not. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch bring a valuable contribution when they 
investigate and report on accusations of impunity and corruption by paramilitary actors, however such 
accusations should be put into proper context. Are state-builders trying to build a pristine Afghanistan or 
are they doing the best with the limited options available in unique cultural environments? In contrast, 
counterinsurgents call for “flexibility of response” when fighting insurgents, however it is rarely stated 
that such flexibility has often required bloodshed on par with conventional warfare.[75]  This small caveat 
is frequently ignored either for the sake of convenience because it is an assumption of warfare we’d rather 
not consider, or because counterinsurgents are true believers in the wonders of soft power options such as 
more roads, schools, and wells.
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